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The European Court of Human Rights
and Political Rights:
The Need for More Guidance
Hans-Martien ten Napel*
The European Court of Human Rights' conception of democracy rather thick, in-
clusive - Increasing number of complaints of violations of Article 3 of the First
Protocol- Requirements of this provision that have to be complied with still thin-
Umitation clauses of Article 11 to be interpreted strictly - Court's response to Is-
lamic political parties and movements - Requirements with respect to the
governance and politics of the States Parties should become stricter - Level of tol-
erance of religion in the public domain ought to increase - Need for more guid-
ance from the Court not just an academic discussion
INTRODUCTION
According to the Preamble of the European Convention On Human Rights (here-
after, ECHR), fundamental freedoms are best maintained by 'an effective political
democracy', among other things. Yet, at the time of drafting of the Convention,
the States Parties were not able to agree on an Article defining the concept of
effective political democracy.!
Tbus, it was not until 20 Marcb 1952 that Article 3 of the First Protocol to the
Convention was adopted, which reads as follows:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable inter~
vals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the
opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.
* Lecturer of Constitutional Law at Leiden University in the Netherlands, also Fellow of the
KM. Meijers Institute for Legal Studies, and Senior Researcher at the Netherlands School of Hu~
man Rights Research. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the conference on
'Multiculturalism - Template for Peace or Recipe for Conflict?', WestYorkshire School of Christian
Studies, Leeds, 8 Dec. 2007, and an academic staff exchange between the Law Faculties of Oxford
and Leiden on 25-27 Sept. 2008. I would like to express my thanks to all participants for their
valuable comments.
1 Susan Marks, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and its "Democratic Society''',
British Yearbook of International Law (London, Oxford University Press 1995) p. 209 at p. 221-224.
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Yet this formulation can also be regarded as 'an unsatisfactory text, which is the
result of a compromise, and which continues to give rise to problems of interpre-
tation.,2
Meanwhile, according to Ovey and White, '[t]he number of complaints of vio-
htions of Article 3 of Protocol 1 is increasing, and there is evidence that the
Court is giving fresh emphasis to this provision as essential to the foundations of
democratic legitimacy of the State.,3 The question is therefore: what are the exact
requirements of this provision of the First Protocol that have to be complied
with?
Before answering this question, we will first explore the Court's conception of
democracy. Because of the important role that political parties phy according to
the Court, the article will also look at the case-hw on Article 11 ECHR concern-
ing freedom of association. Moreover, since the European Courtof Human Rights
interprets this htter Article in the light of Articles 9 and 10 concerning freedom
of thought, conscience and religion and freedom of expression, respectively, rel-
evant parts of the case-law on these Articles will be taken into account as well.4
The article ends with some concluding remarks about necessary adjustments in
the Court's approach to political rights for it to be of greater relevance to the
interpretation of national law.
THE COURT'S CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY
As the text of Article 3 of the First Protocol is not entirely clear, the European
Commission of Human Rights (hereafter: ECmHR) and, hter, the European Court
of Human Rights have had to determine its precise scope to a considerable extent
by themselves. There was no alternative, if only because, as the Court puts it,
democracy 'appears to be the only political model contemplated by the Conven-
tion and, accordingly, the only one compatible with it.'5
One will search in vain for a well-considered definition of a democratic society
in the case-law of the European Court.6 This is understandable in so far as it is
precisely a feature of such a society that it does not have such an unequivocal
character. A recent resolntion by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
2 Clare Ovey and Robin White,Jacobs and White. The European Convention on Human Rights (Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press 2006) p. 388.
3 Ibid., at p. 390.
4 Since, in a sense, all rights embodied in the European Convention are 'political', including for
example the right to a fair trial, even then this analysis is not complete, but then neither can it be.
5 ECtHR 30 Jan. 1998, Case No. 133/1996/752/951, United Communist Parry 0/ Turkey a.o. v.
Turk,!!, para. 45.
6 Cf. A. Logemann, Grenzen tier Menschenrechte in demokratischen GeseUschaften. Die "demokratische
Gesellschtiff' als Determinante tier Grundrechtsschranken in derEuropdischen Menschenrechtsktmvention (Baden-
Baden, Nomos Verlag 2004) p. 298-299.
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Europe rightly describes democracy as 'an open, never-ending process in which
the freedom of all citizens to affect their own lives should be increased.'?
This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to derive certain contours
of a democratic society from the case-law. Thus, with respectto Article lOon the
freedom of expression, the Court speaks of 'the demands of that pluralism, toler-
ance and broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society',.,8
More generally speaking, the term 'pluralism' also forms the key to the Euro-
pean Court's conception of democracy: 'there can be no democracy without plu-
ralism." In the past the Court had already indicated that freedom of thought,
conscience and religion is indispensable for this: 'The pluralism indissociable from
a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on
it.'tO In recent case-law; however, the Court describes pluralism in an even more
comprehensive manner as 'built on the genuine recognition of, and respect for,
diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural identities,
religious beliefs, artistic, literary and soda-economic ideas and concepts. The har-
monious interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for
achieving social cohesion.,11 Closely related to this is what the Court remarked
earlier, namely that ~democracydoes not simply mean that the views of a majority
must always prevail: a balance must be achieved that ensures the fair and proper
treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.'12
With a view to the pluralism envisaged by the Court, the freedom of associa-
tion in general is of great value. Political parties in particular, however, can be
regarded as
a form of association essential to the proper functioning of democracy (...). (...)
By the proposals for an overall societal model which they put before the electorate
and by their capacity to implement those proposals once they come to power, po-
litical parties differ from other organizations which intervene in the political
arena. 13
7 Resolution 1547, 'State of Human Rights and Democracy in Europe', adopted by the Assem-
blyon 18 April 2007 (ISm Sitting), para. 42
8 ECtHR 7 Dec. 1976, Case No. 5493/72, Hantfyside v. the UnitedKingdnm, para. 49.
9 United CommunistParry of Turkry, para. 43. Cf. Aernout Nieuwenhuis, 'The Concept of Plural-
ism in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights', European ConstitutionalLaw Review 3
(2007) p. 367.
10 ECtHR 25 May 1993, Case No. 14307/88, Kokkinakil'v. Greece, para. 31.
11 ECtHR 17 Feb. 2004, Case No. 44158/98 (Grand Chamber), Gorzelik a.o. v. Poland, para. 92.
Repeated, for example, in ECtHR 5 Oct. 2006, Case No. 72881/01, The Moscow Branch qf the Salvation
Army v. R1Jssia, para. 61.
12 ECtHR 13 Aug. 1981, Case Nos. 7601/76, 7806/77, Youn~Jamesand websterv. the United
Kingdom, para. 63.
13 ECtHR 13 Feb. 2003, Case Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 (Gnmd Chmn-
ber), Re/ah Partisi (The W,lfare Party) a.a v. Turkey, p= 87.
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There is a clear link with Article 3 of the First Protocol in so far as it speaks of
ensuring the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the
legislature. According to the Court, political parties play an indispensable role in
achieving this:
Such expression is inconceivable without the participation of a plurality of political
parties representing the different shades of opinion to be found within a country's
population. By relaying this range of opinion, not only within political institutions
but also - with the help of the media - at all levels of social life, political parties
make an irreplaceable contribution to political debate, which is at the very core of
the concept of a democratic society (...).14
The role of the state in this matter is, according to the Court, primarily that of an
independent arbiter: 'the State has a duty to remain neutral and impartial.'15 The
state plays an active role, however, in guarding the limits of pluralism, precisely
with regard to political parties. After all,
[t]he possibility cannot be excluded that a political party, in pleading the tights en-
shrined in Article 11 and also in Articles 9 and 10 of th~ Convention, might at-
tempt to derive therefrom the right to conduct what amounts in practice to
activities intended to destroy the rights or freedoms set forth in the Convention
and thus bring about the destruction of democracy C•••).16
All in all, the ftrst interim conclusion can be that the European Court adheres to a
rather thick) inclusive conception of democracy, in the sense of ensuring 'ad-
equate participation of minorities and other margiualized cultural groups.,n In
accordance with this definition, the pluralism envisaged by the Court comprises
not only respect for classical human rights such as freedom of thought, conscience
and religion and freedom of expression, but also the promotion of social cohe-
sion by sincere recognition of and respect for cultural diversity. There is a crucial
role to play here for political parties. With respect to the role of the state, the
Court is more ambivalent. It ought to remain largely neutral, yet has an active part
iu guardiug the limits of pluralism.
14 United Communist Party of Turkry, para. 44.
15 ECtHR 13 Dec. 2001, Case No. 45701/99, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia a.o. v. Moldavia)
para. 116.
16 Re/ab PartITi (The Welfare Party), p= 99.
17 Human Development Report 2004, CulluralLiberty in Todtry's Diverse World (New York, UNDP
2004) p. 55.
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ARTICLE 3 OF THE FIRST PROTOCOL
In the first case in which the European Court of Hwnan Rights had to apply
Article 3 of the First Protocol, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium in 1987, the
Court emphasized its importance in the Convention system. According to the
Court, '[s]ince it enshtines a characteristic principle of democracy, Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 is accordingly of prime importance in the Convention system.,18
Unlike most other substantive clauses in the Convention and its Protocols, the
Article does not start with 'Everyone has the right to' or 'No one shall be', but
with 'The High Contracting Parties undertake to.' It does not follow from this,
however, that it is impossible to derive snbjective rights from the Article. The
Court agreed with the interpretation of the Article developed by the Commis-
sion, i.e., from an 'institutional' right to free elections,19 via the concept of univer-
sal suffrage,20 to the individual right to vote and to stand for election.21 The
different wording of the Article is rather seen to lie 'in the desire to give greater
solemnity to the commitment undertaken and in the fact that the primary obliga-
tion in the field concerned is not one of abstention or non-interference, as with
the majority of the civil and political rights, but one of adoption by the State of
positive measures to "hold" democratic elections.,22 As Article 3 of the First Pro-
tocol does not have a second paragraph containing limitation grounds, as in Ar-
ticles 8-11, the Court has ruled that 'there is room for implied limitations.'2.'
As far as these implied limitations are concerned, the States Parties enjoy a
wide margin of appreciation.24 In the end it is up to the Court, however, to deter-
mine whether 'the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an ex-
tent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that
they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are
not disproportionate.'25 More particularly, the question is whether the free ex-
pression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature remains
ensured.
On the basis of these general principles it is possible to distioguish several
requirements with respect to the governance and politics of the States Parties.
18 ECtHR 2 March 1987, Case No. 9267/81, Mathieu-Mohin and Cleif'!Ytv. Belgium, para. 47.
19 ECmHR 18 Sept. 1961, Case No. 1028/61 (admissibility decision), X v. Belgium.
20 ECmHR 6 Oct. 1967, Case No. 2728/66 (admissibility decision), X v. Federal Republic rif
Germatry.
21 See in particular ECmHR 30 May 1975, Case Nos. 6745/74 and 6746174 (admissibility deci-
sion), W J X, :Y. and Z. v. Belgium.
22 Mathieu-Mohin and Cferjqyt v. Belgium, para. 50.
23 ECtHR 1 July 2004, Case No_ 36681/97, Sante Santoro v. ItalY, para. 54.
24 Ibid.
25 Mathieu-Mohin and Cferjqyt, para. 52.
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The first of these requirements is the presence of a legislature, without which
Article 3 of the First Protocol would not make sense. This was already recognised
by the European Commission of Human Rights in 1969, when it ruled that the
Article 'presupposes the existence of a representative legislature, elected at rea-
sonable intervals, as the basis of a democratic society:26 In practice, the problem
for the Court - fortunately - has not so much been the absence of a legislature in
a particular State Party, but the question of which specific institutions qualifY as
such, apart from obvious examples such as the House of Commons or the Dutch
Second Chamber. After all, according to the Court, the word 1egislature' is not
necessarily limited to national parliamentary bodies. Each time, the term has to be
interpreted in the light of the constitutional structure of the particular state.27
This much is clear: that the body in question needs to have rulemaking author-
ity.'8 More specifically, it has to be an 'inherent ptimary rulemaking power.'29 Con-
sequently, as the Court made clear in 2000 in a case concerning the Vladivostok
Municipal Council and mayor, 'the power to make regulations and by-laws which
is conferred on the local authorities in many countries is to be distinguished from
legislative power, which is referred to in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Con-
vention, even though legislative power may not be restricted to the national parlia-
ment alone.'30 The fact that not only national parliamentary bodies qualifY also
implies that supranational structures can potentially come under the requirements
of Article 3 of the First Protocol In 1987, despite the Single European Act of
1986, the Commission still did not regard the European Parliament as a full legis-
lature.'l Twelve years later, however, the Court designated the European Parlia-
ment as such in the case of a British citizen who had applied in vain to the Electoral
Registration Officer for Gibraltar to be registered as a voter at the elections to the
European Parliament. In deciding this way, the Court took into account, among
other things, the extension of the powers of the European Parliament that had
taken place as a result of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992).32 All in all, the criteria
used by the Court to determine whether an institution qualifies as a legislature do
26 ECrnHR 5 Noy. 1969, CMe Nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67 (cepO")' Th,
Greek case, para. 319.
27 Mathieu-Mohin and Cleifqyt, para.. 53.
28 IV:, X, 1: andZ. v. Belgium.
29 The British 'metropolitan county councils' did not possess such <inherent primary rulemaking
power'. ECmHR 5 July 1985, Case No. 11391/85 (admissibility decision), Booth-Clibborn a.o. v. the
United Kingtkm.
30 ECtHR 25 Jan. 2000, Case No. 51501/99, Cherepkov v. Russia (admissibility decision).
31 ECmHR 9 Dec. 1987, Case No. 11123/84 (admissibility decision), Tete v. r:rankrijk. See aLro
ECmHR 10 March 1988, Case No. 11406/85 (admissibility decision), Fournierv. Frankrijk.
32 ECtHR 18 Feb. 1999, Case No. 24833/94 (Grand Chamber), Matthewsv. the United Kingdom,
para. 54.
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not exhibit outstanding clarity. The approach taken rather resembles the adage
'I know a legislature when I see one.'" As the Article has thus far been applied
mostly to the highest legislative bodies, and the sometimes considerable degree of
local autonomy in the States Parties does not appear to be recognised, it is pos-
sible to maintain that the Court interprets it in a 'minimalistic' way.34
As far as elections for the legislature are concerned, Article 3 of the First Pro-
tocol requires 'free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under condi-
tions that will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people.' For the
Court, this does not imply a preference for a particular electoral system. It allows
the States Parties a wide margin of appreciation in this respect. Thus, in 1987, the
Court ruled that
any electoral system must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the
country concerned; features that would be unacceptable in the context of one sys-
tem may accordingly be justified in the context of another, at least so long as the
chosen system provides for conditions which will ensure the 'free expression of
the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature'.35
This was in line with the approach followed by the Commission, which had al-
ready decided in 1976, in a case against the United Kingdom, that Article 3 of the
First Protocol does not require a particular electoral system such as the system of
proportional representation.36 In 1996, the Commission declared the complaint
of an Italian regional party about the transition to a new and less favourable elec-
toral system inadmissible. According to the Commission, the Convention 'does
not compel the Contracting Parties to provide for positive discrimination in favour
of minorities.'" In 2008, the Court even ruled that an electoral threshold of 10%
33 Ph. Kiiver, Annotation of ECtHR 11 Jan. 2005, Case No. 66289/01, l)v. France, VI European
Human Rights Cases (2005) p. 257-266 at p. 266. The original contains the word 'legislator'.
34 Geert Goedertier and Yves Haeck, <Artikel 3 EP. Recht op vrije en geheime verkiezingen'
[Article 3 First Protocol Right to free and secret elections], in Johan Vande Lanotte and Yves Haeck
(eds.), Handboek EVEN. Deel2. Artikelsgewijze commentaar [ECHR .Handbook. Part 2. Article-lry-article
commentary] (Antwerpen/Oxford, Intersentia 2004) p. 447 at p. 471 [my translation]. C£ Jeroen
Schokkenbroek, 'Free Elections by Secret Ballot', in Pieter van Dijk et al. (eds.), Theory and Practice if
the buropean Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn. (Antwerpen-Oxford, Intersentia 2006) p. 911 at
p.932.
35 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerf'!JIt, para. 54.
36 ECmHR 6 Oct. 1976, Case No. 7140/75 (admissibility decision), X "IT. the United Kingdom. See
also ECmHR 8 March 1979, Case No. 8364/78 (admissibility decision), Kenne4J Linds'!JI 0.0. v. the
United Kingdom; ECmHR 18 Dec. 1980, Case No. 8765/79 (admissibility decision), The Liberal Parry.
Mrs. R. and Mr. P. v. the United Kingrkm; ECmHR 8 Dec. 1981, Case No. 8941/80 (admissibility
decision), X v. Iceland..
37 ECmHR 15 April 1996, Case No. 25035/94, Magnago and Siidtiroler ViJlkspartei v. Itafy.
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in Turkey, although 'excessive', did not violate Article 3 of the First ProtocoL38
Yet, as Ian Budge has remarked, '[w]hat might have been justified then [1983] as
an exceptional measure to buttress a still fragile democracy can hardly be justified
now when the democracy is considered sufficiently stable and mature to seek
membership of the European Union.,39 Moreover, in its resolution on democ-
racy referred to above, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
declared that '[i]n well-established democracies, there should be no thresholds
higher than 3% during parliamentary elections.'40 Only if a whole group of voters
is prevented from taking part in the elections has the Court demonstrated willing-
ness to intervene.41
As set out above, the Court reads into Article 3 of the First Protocol the re-
quirement of universal suffrage. Tbe individual right to vote, however, is not ab-
solute. Exclusion of particular parts or categories of the population is conceivable,
as long as it is compatible with the underlying objectives of the Article. For ex-
ample, the Commission declared a complaint about the reqnirement of 4-year
residency for voting in local elections inadmissible. Although the required term
was rather long, it served the purpose of protecting minorities that otherwise ran
the risk of being outvoted by residents of other regions who might move to
Trentino-Alto on purpose shordy before the elections: 'The Commission recognises
the importance of the protection of linguistic minorities for stabilitY, democratic
security and peace, which has been shown by the upheavals of European history,
and as a source of cultural wealth and traditions.,42 In a similar vein, the Court
ruled in 2005 that there was no violation of Article 3 in the case of a requirement
of a 10-year residency for the right to vote. This was because of special circum-
stances in New Caledonia on the way to self-determination, after a turbulent po-
litical and institutional history.43 Prisoners constitute a special category of voters.
Originally they could also be excluded from the right to vote, because - as the
Commission put it - it concerned a 'limited group of individuals,.44 In 2005, how-
ever, the Court ruled in Hirst v. the United Kingdom - referring to recent Canadian
38 ECtHR 8July 2008, Case No. 10226/03, Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey.
39 As quoted in the Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Vajic, Jaeger and Sikuta,
para. 5.
4D 'State of Human Rights and Democracy in Europe', para. 58.
41 ECtHR 22 June 2004, Case No. 69949/01, AZiZv. (ypms. See also ECtHR 8 July 2008, Case
No. 9103/04, The Georgian Labour Partyv. Georgia.
42 ECmHR 15 Sept. 1997, Case No. 23450/94 (admissibility decision), Polacco and Garofalo v.
Italy.
43 ECtHR 11 Jan. 2005, Case No. 66289/01, Iyv. France.
44 ECmHR 6 Oct. 1967, Case No. 2728/66 (admissibility decision), X v. Federal Republic of
Germany. See also ECmHR 14 April 1998, Case No. 24827/94 (admissibility decision), Holland
v. Ireland.
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case-law - that ptisoners could not be deprived of their right to vote without
taking into account relevant factors such as the length of the prison sentence and
the severity of the offence in question. 45 All in all, the Court has not often found
violations of Article 3 of the First Protocol in connection with the right to vote,
although it has to be admitted that this is partly because - in contrast with its case-
law on electoral systems - the Court has occasionally been willing to take into
account the position of minorities and other special circumstances. Apart from
Hirstv. the United Kingdom, Matthews v. the United Kingdom (1999) was a well-known
case in which the Court established a violation of the Article, but only because in
1994 Gibraltar had not held European elections at all.46
With respect to the conditions under which the right to stand for election can
be exercised, the States Parties enjoy a considerable margin of appreciation as
well. Although these conditions usually serve the purpose of guaranteeing the
independence of the representatives once they have been elected and the free-
dom of choice of the voters, the exact criteria can vary once again as a result of
historical and political circumstances. According to the Court, the right to stand
for election can he subjected to even stricter conditions than the right to vote. 47
Nevertheless, in recent years, the Court appears to find more violations of the
tight to stand for elections than of the right to vote. The first time, in 2002, con-
cerned a language test that politicians in Latvia had to pass in order to qualify for
the list of candidates in parliamentary elections, and the Court found that the
procedure that had been followed was considered unfair.48 Other violations also
mostly concerned newer member states of the Council of Europe.49
According to Ovey and White, 'there has been considerable narrowing of the
wide margin of appreciation referred to in the earlier cases now that the Court
seems to be adopting a more robust test for interferences which States impose.'so
On the basis of the analysis above, however, the second interim conclusion must
be that despite the increasing number of complaints of violations of Article 3 of
the First Protocol, the requirements of this provision that have to be complied
with are still thin in light of the inclusive democracy conception the Court ad-
heres to. It is not only the case that the term iegislature' is being interpreted in a
minimalistic way in the light of the growing importance attached to the protection
and strengthening of local democracy in Europe but also, with respect to electoral
45 ECtHR 6 Oct. 2005, Case No. 74025/01 (Grand Chamber), Hirstv. the United Kingdom.
46 ECtHR 18 Feb. 1999, Case No. 24833/94, Matthews v. the United Kingdom.
47 ECtHR 19 Oct. 2004, Case No. 17707/02, Melt!Jchenko v. Ukraine, para.. 57.
48 ECtHR 9 April 2002, Case No. 46726/99, Podkolzina v. LaMa.
49 See, for example, ECtHR 19 Oct. 2004, Case No. 17707/02, Melt!Jchenko v. Ukraine; ECtHR
19 July 2007, Case Nos. 17864/04 and 21396/04, Krasnov and Skuratov v. Russia.
50 Ovey and White, supra ll. 2, p. 399.
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systems, that the Court establishes an absolute minimum stand:rrd while, p:rrticu-
illly with respect to the right to vote, it has only r:rrdy established violations. This
approach can be regarded as traditionally Western from a comparative perspec-
tive, insofar as it emphasizes 'individual freedoms, civil liberties and human rights,
separation of powers between the three main branches of government, and po-
liticallegitimacy rooted in the popul:rr will.'51 This may not sound surprising, after
all, in the sense that it involves the European Court of Human Rights. Yet at least
one author speaks of a Rawlsian formal conception of the state, in so far as it
remains limited to guaranteeing a basic societal structure in which everyone has a
more or less equal chance to pursue his or her individual purpose in life.52 The
choice for this particular conception of the state is not self-evident, even for an
admittedly Western Court. Thus, according to the theory of multiculturalism, states
are under an obligation to actively recognise and accommodate religious, ethnic,
cultural and linguistic diversity in order to facilitate a functioning and stable liberal
democracy in pluralist societies.53
ARTICLE 11 ECHR
According to the Court, in so f:rr as political parties :rre concerned, the limitation
clauses in the second p:rragraph of Article 11 ECHR have to be interpreted strictly:
(...) only convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on such par-
ties' freedom of association. In determining whether a necessity within the mean-
ing of Article 11 § 2 exists, the Conttacting States have ouly a limited margin of
appreciation, which goes hand in hand with rigorous European supervision em-
bracing both the law and the decisions applying it, including those given by inde-
pendent courts.54
Perhaps p:rrtly for this reason, the Conrt has in recent ye:rrs established more
violations of Article 11 than of Article 3 of the First Protocol.
51 Kennedy Graham, The Role of RegionalOrganizations in Promoting Democrary, Background Paper
#7, The 6th International Conference of New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD-6) Doha, Qatar,
29 Oct.-l Noy. 2006, p. 10. See also Marks, supra n. 1.
52 Pieter vanden Heede, 'Het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens en het partijverbod:
dansen op een slap koord' [The European Court of Human Rights and banning political parties:
walking the high-wire], in Maurice Achms and Patricia Popelier (eds.), Rechten democratic. De democratische
verbeelding van het recht [Law and democrary. The democratic illusion of law] (Antwerpen-New York-Oxford,
Intersentia 2004) p. 193 at p. 221.
53 Hans-Martien Tb.D. ten Napel and Florian H. Karim Theissen, 'Taking Pluralism Seriously.
The US and the EU as Multicultural Democracies?', in Bart C. Labuschagne and Reinhard W
Sonnenschmidt (eds.), Religion, Politics andLaw. PhilosophicalRiflections on the Sources of Normative Order
in Society (Leiden-Boston, Brill 2009) p. 363-392.
54 United Communist Party 0/ Turk~, para. 46.
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Thus, for example, in its judgment in the case of the United Communist Party if
Turkey (1998) the Court established a violation of Article 11, because the ban on
the party concerned was not proportionate.55 The same goes for the cases con-
cerning the Socialist Party (1998),56 the Freedom andDemocracy Party (OZdep) (1999),57
Yazar a.o. (2002),58 Diclepour le Parti de la Democratie (DEP) (2002),59 Parti Socialiste
de Turquie (STP),60 Emek Partisi et~enol (2005),61 Guneri a. o. (2005)62 and Demokratik
Kitle Partisi etEJr°3 against Turkey. All of these cases concerned pro-Kurdish par-
ties. Other caSes involved parties in Russia,64 Romania,65 Greece,66 Bulgaria,67
Moldavia68 and the Czech Republic."
As a matter of fact, the Court has established so many violations of Article 11
that the occasions in which the Court did not establish a violation draw attention.
In its important Grand Chamber judgment Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) a.o. v.
Turkey (2003), the Court formulated two concrete conditions that political parties
have to meet when proposing changes to the legislation or constitutional struc-
ture of the state: 'flrstly, the means used to that end must be legal and democratic;
secondly, the change proposed must itself be compatible with fundamental demo-
cratic principles.'?O Application of these criteria in this case led the Court to the
conclusion that the ban on the Islamic Welfare party did not result in a violation
of Article 11.
According to the Court, 'a plurality of legal systems, as proposed by Refah,
cannot be considered to be compatible -with the Convention system:71 In addi-
tion, more generally, the Court concurred with 'the Chamber's view that sharia is
incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy, as set forth in the
55 Ibid., para. 61.
56 ECtHR 25 May 1998, Case No. 20/1997/804/1007, S,daB,t Party a.,. v. Turkey.
57 ECtHR 8 Dec. 1999, Case No. 23885/94, Freedom and DemoCrat;] Parry (OZdep) v. Turkt;y.
58 ECtHR 9 April 2002, Case Nos. 22723/93, 22724/93 and 22725/93, Yazar a.a v. Turkey.
59 ECtHR 10 Dec. 2002, Case No. 25141/94, Didepour/e Parti de la Democratie (DEP) c. Turquie.
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Convention.,n With respect to secularism, it ruled that this 'is certainly one of the
fundamental ptinciples of the State which are in harmony with the rule of law and
respect for human tights and democracy. An atritude which fails to respect that
principlewill not necessarily be accepted as being covered by the freedom to mani-
fest one's religion.'73
Less well-known but also noteworthy is an admissibility decision of December
2006. The Russian All-Nation Union had been declined registration because the
Russian constitution forbade religious and ethnic parties. The Court ruled that
there was no violation of Article 11, because 'the applicant's ability to lead a public
association - whether based on ethnic affiliation as in the instant case, or other-
wise - in the pursuit of that association's objectives has been unhampereci.'74
Just 4 days later, the Court ruled that the ban on an Islamic association that
aimed to introduce sharia in Germany, among other things, also constituted no
violation of Article 11. The measure was considered proportionate, because the
association acted against the democratic order.75
Nor was a violation of Article 11 established a year later in the case of a French
party that was not registered in the financial register (necessary for public co-
financing), because the largest part of its income came from a Basque party in
Spain76 Otherwise, the cases in which no violation of Article 11 was established
all concerned religious groupings (Refah, Russian All-Nation Union, and
Kalifatstaa~.This makes the rather exceptional withdrawal of its own case by the
Turkish Fazilet Partisi, the successor to Refah, more understandable. InAptil 2006,
the party withdrew its case because of a lack of confidence in the Court. The
Court was believed to have been prejudiced against Muslims in the Refah case,
among others.77
All in all, the third intetim conclusion must be that with respect to Article 11,
the Court reacts relatively substantially and in a rather exclusivistic manner to Is-
lamic political parties and movements in particular, paradoxically because of the
same overly formal approach to democracy that led to remarkably thin require-
ments in the case of Article 3 of the First Protoco!."' This impression is rein-
72 Ibid., para. 123.
73 Ibid., para. 93.
74 ECtHR 7 Dec. 2006, Case No. 17582/05 (admissibility decision), Igor VladimirovichArtyomov
v. Russia.
75 ECtHR 11 Dec. 2006, Case No. 13828/04, Kalifatstaatv. Germa'!Y.
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d'Iparra!de c. France.
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forced by judgments of the Court in several headscarf cases. Thus, for example,
in Leyla ~ahin v. Turkey (2005), the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that al-
though a Turkish ban on wearing headscarves at state universities interfered with
the right of students to manifest their religion, the interference can nevertheless
be justified as necessary in a democratic society.79
These judgments by the ECtHR have rightly raised severe concern. Thus, for
example, Kevin Boyle in 2004 qllllified the judgment in the ReJah case as 'unfortu-
nate and wrong':
There seems little doubt that in Rifah the European Court has sought to weld to-
gether human rights, democracy and secularism. Is this the longer-term purpose
of the judgment? Is it laying down a European model of human rights and demo-
cratic pluralism that is predicated on secularism? W'hat implications flow for the
rights protected under article 9 of freedom on re1igion?80
A year later, during a conference in Strasbourg, T. Jeremy Gunn argued that (what
was ar the time) the Chamber's judgment inLeyla ~ahin v. Turkey 'serves as a warn-
ing of how failing to analyse the issues objectively and openly can resnlt in the
suppression of human rights by an institution that was created to protect them.,81
According to Tore Lindholm, who qualified the judgment as 'very problematic',
'[P]ublic discussion of the evolving case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights (...) is called for, generally, and with respect to a growing number of cases
on the human right to freedom of religion or belief'" Finally, Ingvill Thorson
Plesner warned that
the approach of the ECtHR in the above mentioned cases exhibit[s] an under-
standing of the role of religious manifestations in the public realm that resembles
what we might call 'secular fundamentalism' or 'fundamentalist secularism', C•..)
The 'fundamentalist' aspect of this app.roach lies in the fact that it imposes a secu-
preparation ror the use of force'. Dan Gordon, 'Limits on Extremist Political Parties: A Compari-
son of Israeli Jurisprudence with that of the United States and West Germany', 10 Hastings Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Review (1987) p. 347 at p. 376-377.
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(Case Note), EuConst2 (2006), p. 268-292.
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larist way of life on all individuals when they enter the public domain, also on
those whose religious identity calls for certain manifestations like wearing a par-
ticular jewel, clothing or other symbols.83
Especially the ban by the German Federal Administrative Court of Kalifstaatwas
probably 'justified and by no means disproportionate' because the association
contravened the principles of democracy and the rule of law as such.84 Yet, as
Karen Meerschaut and Serge Gutworth have argned in an excellent book chapter
published in 2008, 'legal pluralism cannot abstractly be coined incompatible with
the Convention or as inherently discriminatory, as the Court seems to assume. It
depends on the scope of legal pluralism as well as the form and content of the
parallel religious or customary law to be practiced.'85 That it is possible to discuss
the topic of the rights of religious groups within a secular state in a more nuanced
way, is demonstrated by the lecture delivered by the Archbishop of Canterbury at
the Royal Courts of Justice on 7 February 2008, under the chairmanship of Lord
Phillips of Worth Matravers, the Lord Chief Justice. In this lecture Archbishop
Williams discusses a system of 'supplementary jUrisdictions', based on the funda-
mental civil right to use private arbitration." As the Lord Chief Justice himself
has pointed out, '[t]here is no reason why principles of Sharia Law, or any other
religious code should not be the basis for mediation or other forms of alternative
dispute resolution.'87 Advocating a system of 'parallel jurisdictions' goes admit-
tedlya step further, yet does not automatically do away with the State's role as the
gnarantor of individual rights and freedoms either. ill a system which requires
citizens to have matters such as marriage, divorce or inheritance adjudicated un-
der the relevant religious rules (tncluding, in the case of Muslims, Sharia law),
83 Ingvill Thorson Plesner, 'The European Court of Human Rights between Fundamentalist
and Liberal Secularism', p. 1, 3 <http://www:strasbourgconference.org/papers.php>, visited 5Jan.
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these tights and freedoms could and should be protected via judicial review, nota-
bly by the constitutional court, as is for example the case in India.ss
CONCLUSION
In a speech delivered in the spring of 2008, the President of the European Court
of Human Rights righdy reminded his audience. that the area of discretion ac-
corded to States is a consequence of precisely the place ofdemocracy in the Con-
vention scheme. He added, however:
But just as democracy furnishes the raison d'ifre and the justification for the margin
of appreciation, it also establishes its limits. In other words as we approach the
core operation ofdemocracy, such as the right to vote and the fight to form politi~
ca! parties or again the right to participate in free political debate, so the margin of
appreciation contracts almost to vanishing point.89
On the basis of the case-law discussed above, the thesis of Ovey and White that
the number of complaints of violations of Article 3 of the First Protocol is in-
creasing can be endorsed. At the same time, a number of party ban cases have
been decided under Article 11. This change can largely be explained by the acces-
sion to the Council of Europe of new - and from a democratic point of view
often less stable - states such as Bulgaria (1992), Romania (1993), Latvia (1995),
Moldavia (1995), Ukraine (1995), the Russian Fedetation (1996) and Georgia (1999).
Given the character of the cases from the period since 1999 in particular, the
Court's case-law on Article 3 of the First Protocol and indeed its case-law on
Article 11 ECHR can without doubt be called important for the newer States
Parties90 For the more established States Parties, such as the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, it has considerably fewer consequences. Although this in itself
is of course not necessarily a bad sign, what does constitute a problem is that the
case-law is not in line with the Court's own thick, inclusive democracy conception.
For this purpose a double adjustment is necessary: the requirements with respect
to the governance and politics of the States Parties should become stricter and the
level of tolerance of religion in the public domain ought to increase.
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89 International Conference 'Protection of the Democratic Values in Administration of Jus-
tice', Baku, 2 May 2008, p. 2. See also Jean-Paul Costa, The Links Between Democracy and Human
Rights under the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, Helsinki,S June 2008 <http:/
/www:echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/press/Other-t-Information/presidents+speeches/>, vis-
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90 Cf. Alistair Mowbray, The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in the Promotion
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According to Kiiver, it is inherent to the character of the Conncil of Europe as
an international organisation consisting of sovereign states that the requirements
with respect to the internal constitutional relations can only be rninimal.91 On the
other hand, there is increasing attention recently within constitutional law for the
question of constitutionalism in divided societies. According to a special issue of
the InternationalJournal of Constitutional Law, this concerns topics that range from
'symbolic issues, such as the wording of preambles, to the choice of officiallan-
guages; to the existence and character of internal political boundaries; the nature
of the electoral system used to elect the legislature; the selection process, compo-
sition, and powers of the political executive, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary;
the rules governing the formation of political parties; and the relationship be-
tween religious institutions and the state.,92
One complication for a similar operationalisation of the inclusive democracy
conception of the Court is that relatively few points of departure for it can be
found in the text of the Convention. Therefore, questions will first have to be
discussed in political forums, such as whether in order to guarantee an actual plu-
ralism, the role of the state must not only be neutral and independent, but also
relatively passive. Still, the Court can also be expected to make a contribution,
since judges are 'inevitably political philosophers too of a sort.'" The different
wording of Article 3 of the First Protocol could be used, more than in the past, to
emphasise the positive obligations of the States Parties. After all, according to the
Court, the phrase 'The High Contracting Parties nndertake to' is seen to lie 'in the
fact that the primary obligation in the field concerned is not one of abstention or
non-interference, as with the majority of the civil and political rights, but one of
adoption by the State of positive measures."4 The applicarion of Article 11 can
be changed by the Court itself anyway. Hopefully, the Court will realise this in
response to criticism of the less inclusive treatment of religion in the public do-
main in general, and Islam in particular, among other things that its case-law has
given proof of.
In 2007 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a re-
port on the state of democracy in Europe, in which
the Assembly expresses its concern over the increasing number of deficits of de~
mocracy which may be observed in all Council of Europe member states. The
91 Ph. Kiiver, Annotation of Sante Santoro v. ftab, V European Human Rights Cases (2004) p. 795 at
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93 Marks, supra n. 1, p. 238.
94 Mathieu-Mohin and Cleift!Yt v. Belgium, para. 50.
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dysfunctioning of some political institutions, insufficient representativeness of
many parliaments, too numerous concerns over implementation of basic prin-
ciples of democracy such as separation ofpowers, political freedoms, transparency
and accountability, result in the increasing feeling of political discontent and disaf-
fection among cirizens.95
Seen from this perspective, the need for more guidance from the Court for the
interpretation at the national level of the fundamental political rights dealt with in
this article is not just an academic discussion.
95 <State of Human Rights and Democracy in Europe'> p. 1.
